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The Concept of Intent in Rulings of the
Court of Justice of the European Union
J.M. ten VOORDE*
The concept of intention is used in different ways in many regulations of the EU.The Court of
Justice of the EU has given a description of intention and accepted dolus eventualis as a form
of intention. This article examines several relevant judgments of the Court, especially case
C-396/12.These judgments show a double emancipation process. Not only are legal concepts
used in the European Union emancipated from those concepts used in the national legal
traditions of the Member States. These concepts are also emancipated from the field of law in
which they were developed in the Member States.
1 INTRODUCTION
In case C-396/12, the Court of Justice of the EU gave an explanation of the
meaning of the concept of intentional non-compliance in Regulations Nos
1698/2005 and 1975/2006, again accepted dolus eventualis (a description of which
will be given below) as a form of intent, and gave a ruling on the criteria
according to which a beneficiary of aid may be held responsible for an act or
omission of a third party.
The European Union (EU) common agricultural policy is partly aimed at
developing and encouraging an environmental-friendly farm management in
accordance with provisions of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European
Union (Articles 38 and 191 respectively). Farm management is supported by
subsidies in the form of income support for farmers (called beneficiaries of aid)
who in return are obliged to take measures that are aimed at protecting the
environment. One aspect of this environmental friendly farm management is that
the spreading of manure must take place at a low level in emissions. Not respecting
this and other requirements as a result of an action or omission directly attributable
to the beneficiary of aid shall lead to the cancelation or reduction of subsidies
(Article 51 Regulation No 1698/2005). The regulations do not make clear what
national authority should carry out inspections, nor what authority should be
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charged with the decision to cancel or reduce the income support. In the
Netherlands, the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority
(Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit) (formerly the General Inspection Service
(Algemene Inspectiedienst)), carries out inspections to assess compliance with the
regulation requirements of the common policy. When the Authority finds an
instance of non-compliance, a provincial executive of the province within which
the farm is situated adopts a decision to cancel or reduce the subsidy.
A distinction is made between non-compliance due to negligence on the part
of the beneficiary of aid and intentional non-compliance (Article 23 Regulation
No 1975/2006).The meaning of negligence and intent are not made clear in the
regulations.Article 8 of the Dutch Policy Decree on the adoption of the common
agricultural policy (Beleidsregels over de toepassing van het normenkader randvoorwaarden
in het kader van de directe inkomenssteun aan landbouwers in het kader van het
Gemeenschappelijk landbouwbeleid), describes various criteria on the basis of which it
may be determined whether the beneficiary of aid acted intentionally. Amongst
others, these criteria concern: ‘the complexity of the cross-compliance
concerned’, whether or not there was ‘a long-established, settled policy’, and the
farmer’s ‘active performance of an act or the deliberate omission of an act’.1
In the case which I will discuss in this article, the General Inspection Service
carried out an inspection to assess compliance with the requirements of the
common agricultural policy by the Van der Ham holding.The Service determined
that manure had been spread in a manner which was in breach of the common
agricultural policy. It was established that the manure was spread by an agricultural
contractor who was employed by Van der Ham. In accordance with the
aforementioned Policy Decree, the Provincial Executive of the province of
Southern-Holland reduced the subsidies to Van der Ham by 20%, stating that the
latter had intentionally failed to comply with the rules of the Decree. Intent was
established ‘on the ground that the obligation to spread manure in a manner which
is low in emissions is a long-established, settled policy within the meaning of
Article 8(2)(c) of the Decree’.
Van der Ham and his wife (Van der Ham-Beijersen van Buuren) started an
action against this decision. The district court of The Hague dismissed the claim,
but the Dutch Council of State stayed the procedure and asked three questions to
the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter: the Court). These three
questions were: ‘How should the term “intentional non-compliance” (…) be
understood?’; ‘Does European Union law preclude a ruling in a Member State
1 Decree 24 Jul. 2006, Staatscourtant 2006, 148, p. 8, replaced by the Decree of the State Secretary for
Economic Affairs,Agriculture and Innovation of 16 Dec. 2010, Staatscourtant 2010, 20450.The criteria
for establishing intention are mentioned in Art. 5 of the new Decree.They are the same as the ones in
Art. 8 of the former Decree.
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that there is “intentional” non-compliance with a scheme, within the terms of
those regulations, simply because one or more of the (…) circumstances
(mentioned in Article 8 of the Policy Decree (or rules?) obtained’; ‘Can
“intentional non-compliance” be attributed to the beneficiary of the aid if a third
party carries out the works on his instructions?’ The ruling of the Court is
interesting because it gives a (regulation-dependent) description of intent, accepts
‘dolus eventualis’, makes clear how to decide whether or not someone acted
intentionally, and lays down when a beneficiary of aid acts intentionally in the
event an act is committed by a third party hired by the beneficiary of aid.
2 THE COURT’S RULINGS
The Court answered the first question as follows. First, the relevant regulations do
not describe the meaning of ‘intentional non-compliance’. Secondly, these
regulations do not refer to the law of the Member States.2 It follows from this that
‘intentional non-compliance’ must be determined by ‘an independent and uniform
interpretation’. In deciding on the meaning of ‘intentional non-compliance’, the
Court took into account ‘the usual meaning of those words, the context of those
articles [art. 23 Regulation No 1975/2006 and Articles 66 and 67 Regulation No
796/2004] and the objective pursued by the legislation of which they are part’
(paragraph 32). The Court ruled that ‘intentional non-compliance’ is made up of
two elements, an objective element (‘non-compliance’) and a subjective element
(‘intent’). Intent is described as engaging in particular conduct ‘either with the aim
of bringing about a situation of non-compliance with the rules on
cross-compliance, or not seeking such an objective but accepting the possibility
that non-compliance may result’ (paragraph 35).
The Court answered the second question by firstly stating that that the
relevant regulations do not lay down ‘methods for taking evidence to establish that
non-compliance with the requirements of cross-compliance was intentional’
(paragraph 39).Therefore, Member States are free to incorporate rules of evidence
to establish intent (paragraph 40). When a Member State uses ‘long-established,
settled policy’ as a criterion with high probative value for establishing intent, it
must make it possible for the beneficiary of aid ‘to adduce evidence of the lack of
intent in his conduct’ (paragraph 41).
Concerning the third question, the Court remarked that the sanctioning
regulations were developed to cancel or reduce the subsidies for those who receive
these subsidies and do not act in accordance with the regulations (pars. 44, 52).
2 Court of Justice of the European Union 27 Feb. 2014, Case C-396/12, para. 31 (Van der Ham and
Van der Ham-Reijersen van Buuren). In the following I will refer to the relevant paragraphs in the
text.
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The reduction or cancellation of subsidies is only allowed in the event that
non-compliance with the regulations is committed negligently or intentionally.
However, referring to the opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, the Court stated
that the European legislator ‘wanted [to] make the beneficiary of aid responsible
both for his own acts or omissions and those of third parties’ (paragraph 46).
Therefore, the question the Court had to answer, was not whether or not a
beneficiary of aid can be held responsible under Regulations Nos 796/2004 and
1975/2006 for acts which he did not commit personally. Rather, the question was
on the basis of which criteria he may be held responsible if the act was committed
by a third party. It follows from this that even if a third party committed the act, it
must be established that the beneficiary of aid acted intentionally or negligently
(paragraphs 47, 48).
A beneficiary of aid may be held responsible for acts committed by a third
party, but where ‘a third party who carried out work on his plot on his behalf, it is
necessary that the conduct of that beneficiary is intentional or negligent’
(paragraph 49).The Court further considered that, ‘even if the beneficiary of aid’s
own conduct is not directly the cause of that non-compliance, it may be the cause
through the choice of the third party, the monitoring of the third party or the
instructions given to the third party’ (paragraph 50). Finally, whether or not the
third party himself acted intentionally or negligently is irrelevant for the purpose
of answering the question whether or not the beneficiary of aid may be held
responsible for his negligent or intentional conduct (paragraph 51).
3 THE COURT’S DESCRIPTION OF INTENT
3.1 A ‘UNIFORM’ CONCEPT
The concept of intent is frequently used in different types of European Union
legislation and is expressed in various ways, for example as ‘intentional’
(Regulation No 1975/2006); ‘knowingly’ (Directive 2005/60/EC), ‘knowingly
and intentionally’ (Regulation No 423/2007), ‘with intent’ (Directive
2008/841/JHA). The Court has thus far not given a general ruling on the
meaning of intent.3
In 1979, the Court agreed in the Rinkau judgment that intent is a concept
that should be regarded as an independent concept within the European
Community. This is necessary ‘in order to ensure as far as possible that the rights
3 In competition cases, the Court focuses on the knowledge of the applicant. In ECJ 1 Feb. 1978, Case
C-19/77 (Miller); ECJ 11 Jul. 1989, Case C-246/86 (Belasco) the court ruled that, to establish
whether or not the applicant acted knowingly, it has to be established whether the applicant could
have been aware ‘that they had as their object the restriction of competition between its customers’
(Belasco case, para. 18).
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and obligations of the contracting States and of the persons concerned arising
from the Convention [of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters] are equal and uniform’.4 Equal
and uniform treatment of persons thus form the Court’s main arguments for an
independent interpretation of the concept of intent. In the more recent case of
Afrasiabi and others, the Court ruled that intent is a concept that should be given an
autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union.5 The
Court does not deploy the principles of equality in the Afrasiabi and others
judgment, but points only to the lack of reference in the legal systems of the
Member States, for the purposes of interpreting intent. In my view, this is a
different approach, where a more instrumental perspective is taken, vis-à-vis the
more fundamental reference to the principles of equality and uniformity in the
Rinkau judgment?
In both the Rinkau and Afrasiabi and Others judgments, the Court uses the
term uniform.This could be seen as somewhat misleading, because it is clear that
the Court does not strive for a general interpretation on the concept of intent,
applicable for the whole of EU law. A uniform interpretation of intent actually
means a uniform interpretation of intent, as described in Regulation No 423/2007
concerning restrictive measures against Iran. According to Article 7 of that
Regulation, knowingly and intentionally participating in activities that, directly or
indirectly, circumvent the measures against Iran shall be prohibited. Similar
descriptions of intent can be found in other regulations concerning restrictive
measures against various states, such as Syria.6 Whether the autonomous and
uniform interpretation of ‘knowingly and intentionally’ in Regulation No
423/2007 can be used in other regulations that use the same terms for intent, is
unclear. I do not think it to be unacceptable that one variation of intent, such as
‘knowingly and intentionally’, used in various regulations dealing with the same
issue (e.g., introducing restrictive measures against a state), may be interpreted
similarly in those regulations that deal with different subject areas.This would be
recommendable from the point of view of uniformity, and would enhance
equality. However, the Court should be clearer on this point.
3.2 ‘THE CONTEXT OF THOSE ARTICLES’
Returning to the Rinkau judgment, the Court stated that intent ‘must be
explained by reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of the Convention of 27
September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
4 ECJ 26 May 1981, Case 157/80, para. 11 (Rinkau).
5 ECJ 21 Dec. 2011, Case C-72/11, para. 66 (Afrasiabi and others).
6 See Art. 9 Regulation No. 269/2014 and Art. 12 Regulation No. 224/2014.
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Commercial Matters and, second, to the general principles which the national
legal systems have in common.’7 In the Van der Ham judgment, the Court did not
refer to the ‘general principles’ of the legal systems of the Member States. For the
interpretation of intent, the Court takes into regard ‘the usual meaning of those
words, the context of those articles and the objective pursued by the legislation of
which they are part’ (paragraph 32).8 Thus, for the explanation of the meaning of
intent, grammatical and teleological interpretation are important methods. The
grammatical interpretation method seems also to be have used in the Afrasiabi and
others case, indicated by the fact that the Court uses synonyms to describe the
words ‘knowingly’ and ‘intentionally’.9 However, a teleological interpretation is
more commonly used by the Court.10
The use of the words ‘context of those articles’ has been used only once
before the Van der Ham judgment.11 In that case, the Court was asked whether a
company could invoke force majeure.The interpretation thereof was dependent on
the ‘particular context’ of the articles which the company had to comply with.The
‘particular context’ not only refers to the specific place of the articles in certain
legislation, but also to the interests those articles mean to protect. This seems
insignificant for the meaning of intention. In the Van der Ham case, the phrase of
‘particular context’ seems to refer to the form of intent (e.g., can dolus eventualis be
accepted?) and the way of proving intent.
3.3 THE MEANING OF INTENTION
According to the Court, if a directive or regulation does not make any reference to
the legal systems of the Member States, it is not necessary to refer to the general
principles of the legal systems of the Member States. Obviously, for the
7 ECJ 26 May 1981, case 157/80, para. 11 (Rinkau). Note that the Court refers to the ‘legal systems’ in
general, not to one particular part of those legal systems, like civil law or criminal law. The Court
seems to make clear that, however certain concepts have been developed in a particular part of the law
(like intention in criminal law), that does not mean that for the interpretation of that concept within
European legislation, the Court is obliged to follow the interpretation of that concept in that
particular part of the law.
8 See also ECJ 4 May 2010, Case C-533/08, para. 44 (TNT Express Nederland); ECJ 22 Nov. 2012,
Case C-219/11, para. 13 (Brain Products). See on the Court’s interpretation methods G. Beck, The
Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU 187–233 (Hart Publishing 2012).
9 ECJ 21 Dec. 2011, Case C-72/11, para. 66 (Afrasiabi and others). In case of doubt, a text of a
provision should not be judged in isolation. In that case, ‘it requires that it be interpreted and applied
in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages’ (ECJ 10 Sep. 2009, Case C-199/08,
para. 54 (Eschig)).
10 See amongst others ECJ 9 Mar. 2006, Case C-436/04, para. 35 (van Esbroeck); ECJ 16 Nov. 2010,
Case C-261/09, para. 38 (Mantello); ECJ 27 May 2014, Case C-129/14PPU, para. 79 (Spasic).
11 ECJ 7 May 1991, Case C-338/89 (Danske Slagterier). By force majeure is meant ‘abnormal and
unforeseeable circumstances, outside the operator’s control, the consequences of which, in spite of the
exercise of all due care, could not have been avoided’ (ECJ 17 Oct. 2002, Case C-208/01 (Parras)).
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interpretation of concepts used in both EU Law and the national legal systems of
the Member States, the Court is free to be inspired by the legal systems of the
Member States. Both Advocates-General Bot and Kokott refer to general
principles (in particular international human rights12 – Not only to the Charter of
fundamental rights of the European Union – but also to the laws that the Member
States of the European Union have in common.
From these general principles, the Advocate-General in the case of Afrasiabi
and others (Bot) deduces that ‘the offender should have acted in full awareness and
of his own free will, that is to say, that his awareness and will should not have been
overborne by mental disorder and/or constraint’. According to Bot, the words
intentionally and knowingly (in Regulation No 423/2007) ‘designate therefore the
mental element inherent in the offence here specifically penalized, as expressed by
the legislation providing the basis for the offence, in accordance with the
requirement of precision demanded by the principle of the legality of the criminal
law’.13 Referring to the Afrasiabi and others judgment, Kokott concludes in her
opinion in the Van der Ham case, that intention is made up of two elements: a
mental element and the element of a free will. According to Kokott, this
conclusion ‘is based on a view sufficiently widely accepted in Europe (…) for it to
be assumed that the European Union legislature is guided by it when using the
term intent’.14
The Court uses the word ‘aim’ to describe intention as used in Regulation
No 1975/2006. By using this word, it is clear that the element of free will is part
of the concept of intent. Less clear is whether the mental element is part of the
concept of intent. This concept is not mentioned in several translations of the
Court’s judgment, including the English, French and Dutch translations. However,
a reference to the mental element can be found in the German translation of the
Court’s judgment (‘bewusst’). One could conclude from this that when the term
‘intent’ is used in a European Union regulation, this only contains the free will
element, and not the mental element.15 The fact that the Court emphasizes the
mental element in the case of Afrasiabi and others can be explained by the fact that
besides to intent, the term ‘knowingly’ is used in Regulation No 423/2007. It
seems that the term intent solely contains the free will element, such as in the Van
12 Note that the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the interpretation of intention is for
the contracting states to decide. See e.g., ECtHR 30 Aug. 2011, No. 37334/08 (G./United Kingdom).
13 Opinion A-G Bot in Case C-72/11, para. 84 (Afrasiabi and others).
14 Opinion A-G Kokott, Case C-396/12, para. 35 (Van der Ham) (hereafter: Opinion). See on intention
in European criminal law U. Sieber, Europäisches Strafrecht 276 (Nomos 2011) which states: ‘Das
europäische Strafrecht geht vom Vorsatz als dem Wissen und Wollen der Tatverwirklichung aus.’
15 In ECJ 28 Oct. 2010, Case C-367/09, para. 77 (Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau) the Court
judges that for intention, proof of knowledge is necessary. This brings Klip to the conclusion that
knowledge is part of intention (European Criminal Law. An Integrative Approach 202, n. 793 (Intersertia
2011).The aforementioned judgments show that this is not generally the case.
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der Ham judgment. However, we cannot conclude from either judgment that the
Court limits the meaning of the doctrine of intent to the element of free will.The
Court only explains the meaning of the word ‘intent’, as used in EU regulations.16
4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTENT AND
NON-COMPLIANCE: DOLUS MALUS?
Another question arising from the Court’s judgment in Van der Ham is how
intention is related to non-compliance in Regulation No 1975/2006.17 In
criminal law doctrine, two views can be distinguished in this regard. In the first
view, intent has a neutral character, which means that for proving intent, it is not
necessary to establish that the actor wanted to breach the law, nor that he knew
that he was breaching the law. What is necessary, is that he knew what the
consequences of his act would (or could) be and that his aim was that those
consequences occur. In the second view, to prove intent, it is necessary to establish
that the actor knew that his conduct or the consequences of his conduct was
illegal and that he wanted to trespass the law. In this view, intention is described as
dolus malus.18
In the Van der Ham case, the Court ruled that intentional non-compliance
exists of two elements, an objective and a subjective element. In what way these
elements are interrelated, is not made clear. The impression may be that the two
elements are not related to each other. This could imply that the Court has
embraced the first view of intent described above. However, it is important to
realize that for cancelling or reducing income subsidy, the beneficiary of aid must
have non-complied intentionally.The acts of the beneficiary of aid are thus aimed
at non-compliance or the beneficiary of aid accepts the possibility that
non-compliance may result from his acts.This more closely resembles dolus malus
(paragraphs 35 and 37).19 However, the fact that the Court accepted that intent of
non-compliance can be proved if there was ‘a long-established, settled policy’
forms an argument that dolus malus is not the view the Court holds with regards to
16 In general, it is clear that intention should be distinguished from negligence (ECJ 26 May 1981, Case
157/80, para. 11, 15 (Rinkau)).Acts that were committed intentionally are more serious than acts that
were committed non-intentionally. Therefore, acts committed intentionally justify a higher penalty
(ECJ 15 Jul. 1970, Case 41/69, para. 186 (ACF)).
17 In general, intention is related to all elements of a regulation of which intention is part of (Sieber et
al., p. 276).
18 See J. Blomsma, Mens Rea and Defences in European Criminal Law 85–88 (Intersertia 2012).
19 Dolus malus is not the same as mala in se.The latter refers to crimes which are criminalized because
they are ‘wrong in themselves’ (R.A. Duff, Answering for Crime. Responsibility and Liability in the
Criminal Law 89 Hart Publishing 2007). However, it is not necessary to use dolus malus in the
description of a mala in se, because the crime is wrong in itself.
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intent, as it is then not necessary to prove that the beneficiary of aid knew that
what he was doing was wrong.
Embracing dolus malus in this case would have been contrary to what is
generally accepted in Dutch law, but also in the criminal law of other legal systems
of Member States of the European Union. However, the increase in amount and
complexity of European legislation could provide an argument to accept dolus
malus.20 EU legislation, however, is not clear on this point.21 An argument for the
neutral vision on intent is that citizens who act in a certain highly-regulated part
of the public sphere, should be aware of the regulations that have been adopted in
that part of the public sphere. Unawareness of the law can only be an excuse under
exceptional circumstances.
5 DOES THE COURT ACCEPT DOLUS EVENTUALIS?
The Court distinguishes intent from negligence.22 This important distinction does
not make clear what form of intent is acceptable under EU law. Blomsma argues
that dolus eventualis should not be accepted as the lowest form of intention
available in EU law. Rather, he argues for strengthening of the position of
negligence (in the form of recklessness) in EU law.23 It would appear however that
the Court is taking a different stance. In the Van der Ham judgment, the Court
describes intent not only in terms of ‘aiming’ but also in terms of ‘accepting the
possibility that non-compliance may result’ (pars. 35, 37, 42). In the Dutch and
German versions of the Afrasiabi and others judgment, the Courts uses the
expression ‘op de koop toenemen’ or ‘billingend in kauf nehmen’.24 These
expressions are used in describing dolus eventualis25 and can be seen as a
translation of accepting the possibility (see the English translation of the Afrasiabi
and others judgment).
In the Van der Ham judgment, the Court ruled that the lowest form of intent
can be described as accepting the possibility that non-compliance may result. Legal
20 See Blomsma 88–93 (2012).
21 See e.g., Art. 6 Directive 2013/40/EU (‘intentionally, the access without right’); Art. 5 Directive
2011/92/EU (‘intentional conduct, when committed without right’); Art. 3 Directive 2008/99/EC
(‘unlawful and committed intentionally’).
22 In ECJ 26 May 1981, Case 157/80, para. 15 (Rinkau) negligence offences are described as offences
which were not intentionally committed and may result from carelessness’. A variation of negligence,
serious negligence, ‘must be understood as entailing an unintentional act or omission by which the
person responsible commits a patent breach of the duty of care which he should have and could have
complied with in view of his attributes, knowledge, abilities and individual situation’ (ECJ 3 Jun. 2008,
Case C-308/06, para. 77 (Intertanko)).
23 Blomsma 164–166 (2012).
24 ECJ 21 Dec. 2011, Case C-72/11, para. 67 (Afrasiabi and others). See also Opinion paras 35, 36.
25 See K. Hoffmann-Holland, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil 60–63 (Mohr Siebeck 2011); J. de Hullu, Materieel
strafrecht 225–232 (Kluwer 2012—).
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doctrine recognizes accepting the possibility as the lowest possible (however, not
generally accepted) form of intent.26 The fact that the Court has accepted this
form of intent, is interesting. It makes clear that the Court does not take much
notice of the way in which dolus eventualis is discussed in the various legal systems
of the Member States.27 The Court’s decision follows from and is in agreement
with its ruling that in defining intent, it has regard for ‘the usual meaning of those
words, the context of those articles and the objective pursued by the legislation of
which they are part’.
In the Van der Ham judgment, the Court does not refer to the legal traditions
of the Member States. How can we explain this? One explanation could be that,
the Court does not see fit to interpret intent from the perspective of the dogmatic
foundations of the legal systems of the Member States, because there are too many
differences among the law of the Member States with regards to the interpretation
of intent, including the issue as to what should be the lowest acceptable form of
intention. Another explanation could be that, traditionally, intent is a concept that
is classically used in criminal law, but has nowadays also come to be used in
administrative and tax law. Taking the criminal law perspective as a starting point
could lead to decisions that are not in accordance with the goals of both
administrative and tax laws. By not referring to the national (criminal) legal
systems of the Member States, the Court is able to develop its own interpretation
of intent which may be useful in different fields of law.28 A third explanation for
choosing ‘accepting the possibility’, as the lowest form of intent could be that the
Court does not want a gap to exist between intent and negligence. However, from
a dogmatic point of view, preventing such a gap from occurring does not require
that the lowest form of intent should be accepted. An alternative would be to
accept a higher form of negligence. That would make the lowest form of intent
less relevant. However, it is possible that the Court does not want to introduce a
higher form of negligence in regulations that do not explicitly use this form of
negligence (like Article 4 Directive 2005/35/EC (‘recklessness’ or ‘serious
negligence’) and Article 9, under f Directive 2011/93/EU (‘recklessness’)).29 We
26 See amongst others R. Card, A.R.N. Cross & P.A. Jones, Criminal Law 79–87 (Oxford U. Press 2008);
G.Williams & D.J. Baker, Textbook of Criminal Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2012) Nos 4-019-4-024. See also
various European handbooks in criminal law, for example: J. Remmelink, mr. D. Hazewinkel-Suringa’s
Inleiding tot de studie van het Nederlandse strafrecht 205–206 (Gouda Quint 1996); P. Canin, Droit pénal
général 66 (Hachette 2013); Hoffmann-Holland 2011, pp. 60–61.
27 See Blomsma 2012, pp. 99–134, 142–164.
28 I cannot go into this argument in more detail. See in general R. Widdershoven, Encroachment of
Criminal Law in Administrative Law in the Netherlands, 6 Electronic J. Comp. L. (2002).
29 It may be possible that the Court accepts a difference between negligence and recklessness. However,
in what way negligence and recklessness differ, the Court does not clear. From the Court’s judgments,
we know that the Court recognizes various forms of negligence (see Blomsma 2012, p. 174), but it is
not clear whether the Court sees recklessness as a form of negligence (or vice versa). Neither is it clear
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can only speculate as to this final point.The Court should make clearer clear how
intent and negligence interrelate, especially when the national legal traditions are
of no direct importance for an autonomous and uniform interpretation of these
concepts.
6 CRITERIA TO PROVE INTENT?
In Van der Ham, the Dutch provincial executive decided that Van der Ham had
acted intentionally on the basis that spreading manure in conformity with the
common agricultural policy was ‘a long-established, settled policy’. Following the
Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, the Court rules that such an objective
criterion to prove intent is acceptable, provided that the State makes it possible for
the beneficiary of aid ‘to adduce evidence of the lack of intent of his conduct’
(paragraph 41),30 especially if the criterion that is used has a high probative value.
The Court does not make clear in the Van der Ham case what is meant by high
probative value, nor why some criteria have a high probative value.31 The phrase is
used in other judgments, especially in competition cases. In those cases, ‘high
probative value’ is used for evidence that is very reliable. The reliability of
evidence, e.g., of certain statements, is measured by, among others: ‘(i) the weight
of consistent indicia supporting those statements and (ii) the absence of indicia
that they might have tended to play down the importance of their contribution to
the infringement and maximise that of other undertakings’.32
According to the Advocate-General, most of the criteria mentioned in Article
8 of the Dutch Policy Decree ‘appear capable of supporting a finding of intent’.33
whether the Court accepts any liberty on the part of the member states (the national courts in
particular) to describe both negligence and recklessness in accordance with their own national legal
standards. If that is case, no doubt differences among the member states will occur. For example, the
meaning of negligence under English law differs from that under Dutch (and German) law. Under
Dutch law, negligence does not have a whole objective meaning. Next to this, recklessness is a form of
negligence. This means that to establish recklessness and negligence is similar. Third, negligence and
recklessness differ on the part of the objective element (the more careless the defendant acted and the
more serious the risk for grave consequences, the sooner an act can be called reckless). Under English
law, negligence is not an extreme form of negligence, and recklessness and negligence differ especially
on the side of the subjective element, which in case of negligence is only being taken into account in
exceptional cases. See D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law 128, 148–150 (Oxford U. Press
2011); D.J. Baker, Textbook of Criminal Law, No. 5-002 (Sweet & Maxwell 2012).
30 See also ECJ 23 Dec. 2009, Case C-45/08, paras 43–44 (Spector).
31 This could be explained by the fact that the Court decided that, because the relevant regulations have
not laid down ‘methods for taking evidence to establish that non-compliance with the requirements of
cross-compliance was intentional’ (para. 39). As a consequence, ‘the Member States have the option
of laying down provisions to establish the intentional nature of an infringement of the rules of
cross-compliance’ (para. 40).
32 ECJ 16 Jun. 2011, Case T-191/06, para. 113 (FMC Foret); ECJ 27 Jun. 2012, Case T-448/07, para. 58
(YKK and others).
33 Opinion, para. 45.
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However, not all criteria are suitable for proving intent in themselves. The
criterion of the complexity of a provision or requirement, has a less higher
probative value than other criteria, mentioned in Article 8 of the Decree, because a
complex provision could easily be misunderstood.34 The weight of consistent
indicia supporting the statement made in this criterion is less high and therefore
less reliable.
7 THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A BENEFICIARY FOR ACTS
COMMITTED BY A THIRD PARTY
The final question of the Dutch Council of State to the Court was whether the
beneficiary of aid can be held responsible for acts committed within his company,
without having committed those acts himself, as they were committed by a third
person. If so, the further question was on what grounds the beneficiary of aid may
be held responsible for acts committed by a third person within the beneficiary’s
holding? The answer to the first question was both short and quickly given.
Referring to the legislative history of the relevant regulations, both the
Advocate-General and the Court conclude that the first question must be
answered in the affirmative.35
More important is the ruling of the Court (and the opinion of the
Advocate-General ), on the criteria on the basis of which to decide whether the
beneficiary of aid can be held responsible for acts committed by a third person.
The responsibility of the beneficiary of aid is not a form of strict liability. As I
understand the Court’s decision, the beneficiary of aid is held responsible for
intentional or negligent non-compliance, as if he himself did not comply with the
national legislation (the Dutch Decree), even if in fact it was a third party ‘who
carried out work on [the beneficiary’s] plot on his behalf ’ (paragraph 49). As if the
beneficiary of aid did not comply with the rules himself means that, in order to
establish his responsibility, intent on his part must be proven.36
34 Opinion, para. 47, 42.
35 See Opinion, paras 54–61, and the Court’s ruling in paras 44–46.
36 Compare Opinion, para. 81. Advocate-General Riuz-Jarabo Colomer stated that the ius puniendi is
limited by the principle of guilt and the ‘principle that punishment should only be applied to the
offender’, which he sees as a complement of the principle of culpability, and ‘whose first and most
important manifestation is that only the perpetrator can be charged in respect of unlawful conduct.’
Colomer agrees that these principles have a more limited meaning in administrative cases (see the
Opinion of Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, case 204/00P, paras 63, 64 (Aalborg Portland)).
The Court did not follow Colomer in his opinion (compare Blomsma 2012, pp 224–225). In the Van
der Ham case, what is emphasized is the fact that intention or negligence should always be proved,
because they are a condition for reducing or cancelling a subsidy (and determine the amount of the
reduction). The fact that intention or negligence also has to be established in a case where the
non-compliance was not committed by the beneficiary of aid does not mean that the Court changed
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The Court distinguishes a beneficiary of aid whose acts or omissions have
caused non-compliance directly from a beneficiary of aid whose acts or omissions
have caused non-compliance only indirectly. The first is the least problematic.
From the fact that the beneficiary of aid caused non-compliance directly (e.g., he
gave the order not to comply), follows that he caused non-compliance
intentionally. In that case it would be against the purpose of the relevant
regulations not to make the beneficiary of aid responsible for non-compliance
with the relevant regulations. In my view, the beneficiary of aid can best be
described as an auctor intellectualis, in other words an inciter. However, the relevant
regulations (and the Decree) do not refer to incitement or other forms of
participation.Therefore, not describing the beneficiary of aid as an inciter is quite
an obvious choice,37 because the introduction of forms of participation, without
any basis in the relevant regulations, would be in violation of the principle of legal
certainty.
Determining whether the beneficiary of aid may be held responsible when his
acts or omissions have only indirectly caused the non-compliance is less simple.
Whether or not he can be held responsible is based on three arguments: ‘the
choice of the third party, the monitoring of the third party or the instructions
given to the third party’ (paragraph 50). It is not necessary to establish that the
third party intentionally or negligently did not comply with the conditions set in
the Decree and the relevant regulations (paragraph 51). This means two things.
First, it is not necessary to establish whether the third party did not comply
intentionally or negligently.This makes clear that establishing intent or negligence
on the part of the beneficiary of aid does not depend on the third party’s intention
or negligence. Second, the beneficiary of aid may be held responsible, even if the
third party acted intentionally or negligently. As a result, the beneficiary of aid
cannot hide behind the third party’s own responsibility for non-compliance (pars.
52, 53).
A beneficiary of aid may be held responsible ‘for the infringement if he acted
intentionally or negligently as a result of the choice or the monitoring of the third
party or the instructions given to him’ (paragraph 53). When the beneficiary of
aid, in choosing, monitoring or giving instructions to a third party, acted
intentionally or negligently, he may be held responsible for not complying with
the relevant regulations. In the Van der Ham case, both intent and negligence are
related to the circumstances under which the non-compliance occurred.The more
influence the beneficiary of aid had on the acts of the third party, the more easily
its view.The importance of the Court’s ruling lies in the fact that, in the present circumstances, it sees
the beneficiary of aid as if he himself non-complied with the Decree.
37 Compare Opinion, paras 54–61.
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 567
may his intent or negligence be established, and the sooner the beneficiary of aid
can be ‘made’38 responsible for non-compliance.39
Whilst both the criteria of instructions and monitoring are closely linked
with the act of non-compliance as such, it is less easy to make such a connection
when it comes to the third criterion. We can assume that instructions and
monitoring refer to the third party’s activity’s on the plot of land of the beneficiary
of aid (compare paragraph 49), and that the latter may only be held responsible if
he intentionally or negligently failed in monitoring or giving instructions to the
third party. The criterion of the choice of the third party can be understood as
follows. When the beneficiary of aid hires a third party to work on his plot, if it
could not have been expected that the latter would not comply with the rules or
even was hired because of his reliability and knowledge of the rules with which he
should have complied, ‘making’ the beneficiary responsible for the third party’s
non-compliance would be less likely.
Interestingly, the criteria are depicted alternatively in the German, English and
French translations of the judgment, but cumulatively in the Dutch translation.40
From the assumption that the alternative enumeration is the correct version of the
Court’s judgment, it follows that each of these criteria are sufficient for proving
intent (or negligence). So, intentionally choosing a third party who is expected not
to comply, may result in the beneficiary of aid’s responsibility. That means that
responsibility may be established quite easily. This is in accordance with the
legislative history of the relevant regulations, but one could question whether
responsibility should be established so easily on the basis of a criterion that is not
closely linked to the act of non-compliance. On the other hand, this criterion
makes clear that the beneficiary of aid should pick his staff carefully and instruct
his employees on a permanent basis, especially concerning the regulations with
which the beneficiary of aid must comply in order to receive subsidies. However, it
is not clear whether this criterion can be explained in this way and the Court
should expand on this in more detail in future judgments.
38 To be made responsible are the terms used in the German translation of the judgment (‘gemacht
werden’).
39 Several of these criteria resemble the criteria the Court developed in establishing responsibility of a
parent company for the activities of subsidiaries. In the Akzo Nobel and others case, the Court ruled
that the parent company can be held responsible for activities of subsidiaries when the parent
company can ‘decisive influence’ or ‘there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent company does in
fact exercise decisive influence’ over de conduct of the subsidiaries (ECJ 10 Sep. 2009, Case C-97/08
P, paras 60–62 (Akzo Nobel and others)).
40 And again, the Court does not refer to the legal traditions of the Member States. See for a different,
and in my opinion at present outdated opinion, Sieber 2011, p. 277.
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8 SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Court has opted for an autonomous and uniform interpretation of intent.The
question remains why the Court did not choose for a general description of the
concept of intent and then give a derivative explanation per regulation or
directive. The Court’s acceptance of dolus eventualis, the lowest form of intent
generally recognized in doctrine, will, I suspect, lead to various cases before the
Court, Not only because accepting the lowest form of intent will probably give
rise to difficulties for national courts who do not recognize dolus eventualis, simply
because it is not part of their daily legal vocabulary, but also because it is not clear
why the Court has chosen for this form of intent and not for a broader concept
description of negligence. Not accepting strict liability, and ruling that a
beneficiary of aid must have acted intentionally or negligently, is not new, but the
manner in which the Court described how a beneficiary of aid may be held
responsible for an act committed by a third party, is.41 What is interesting, is that a
beneficiary of aid is responsible for non-compliance, because he is held responsible
as if he committed the act of non-compliance himself.As a consequence, it must to
be established that the beneficiary of aid acted intentionally or negligently.This is
because intent or negligence are necessary to establish liability.To establish whether
the beneficiary of aid acted intentionally or negligently, national authorities must
take into account the choice for, the instructions to, or the monitoring of the third
party. Whether these criteria are enumerated alternatively or cumulatively is at
present unclear. It is not unthinkable that the criteria of instructions and
monitoring are of the most value, in particular because they are more closely
linked to the actual non-compliance of the third party.The question is whether it
is desirable to use the criterion of the choice of the third party to establish liability
of the beneficiary of aid.
An important element of this case is that national legal traditions are no
(longer) relevant for the meaning and form of legal concepts such as intent and
negligence.To understand such legal concepts, the Courts takes into account ‘the
usual meaning of those words, the context of those articles and the objective
pursued by the legislation of which they are part’. Apparently, an autonomous
interpretation of legal concepts means that these concepts are to be developed
independently from the legal traditions of the Member States of the European
Union.This is not just the case with concepts that are relatively new or are under
development in the Member States, but also with well-established concepts, such
as that of intent.We can call this a double emancipation process.The legal concepts
used in the European Union are emancipated from those concepts used in the
41 Compare J. Keiler, Actues Reus and Participation in European Criminal Law 200–209 (Intersertia 2013).
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national legal traditions of the Member States. But, and here we see a second
emancipation process, these concepts are also emancipated from the field of law in
which they were developed in the Member States. Both forms of emancipation
give the Court much room to manoeuver and thus to develop its own doctrine.
Legal scholars whose research takes place on the boundaries of various parts of the
law are challenged to conduct more research in the field of substantive law in
order to assist the Court in further developing its concepts.
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